Risks and Supervisory Challenges ofFinancial Conglomerates in Korea by 함준호
韓國開發硏究 
제28권  제1호(통권  제97호)  
 
 
Risks and Supervisory Challenges of 
Financial Conglomerates in Korea 
 
Joon-Ho Hahm 
(Associate Professor, International Economics and Finance,  
Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University) 
Joon-Kyung Kim 
(Senior Fellow, Korea Development Institute) 
 
금융그룹화와 금융위험: 실증분석 및 정책과제 
함  준  호 
(연세대학교 국제학대학원 부교수) 
김  준  경 
(한국개발연구원 선임연구위원) 
 
* (함준호-제1저자, 김준경-공저자) This paper is a revised version of the paper presented at the 2004 
KDI/KAEA international conference on ‘Current Economic Issues of Korea,’ Seoul, August 10, and at 
the EWC/KDI conference on ‘Regulatory Reforms in the Age of Financial Consolidation: Emerging 
Market Economy and Advanced Countries,’ Honolulu, Hawaii, July 29-30, 2004. The authors thank 
Howell Jackson and two anonymous referees for numerous constructive comments. The first author 
also gratefully acknowledges a financial support from the Yonsei University. 
•  Key Word: Financial Consolidation(금융대형화), Financial Conglomerate(금융그룹), Risk 
(리스크), Supervision(금융감독) 
•  JEL code: G20, G21, G28 
•  Received: 2005. 10. 6     •  Referee Process Started: 2005. 11. 3       
•  Referee Reports Completed: 2005. 12. 29 
 
  
 ABSTRACT  
 
This paper studies implications of financial conglomeration for both financial risk of individual 
conglomerates and systemic risk potential in post-crisis Korea. Our analyses suggest that we cannot 
conclude that financial conglomerates are taking on higher risks relative to non-conglomerate 
independent institutions. We also find that larger financial institutions show a significantly higher 
profitability and lower variability in profitability operating on a superior efficient frontier. However, 
it turns out that the consolidation has raised systemic risk potential as direct and indirect 
interdependencies among large banking institutions have substantially increased. Furthermore, 
financial conglomerates have become more vulnerable to contagion risks from non-bank sectors and 
capital markets. In the face of the shifting risk structure, financial supervisory and regulatory systems 
must be upgraded toward a more risk-based, consolidated supervision. Prompt corrective action 
provision for financial conglomerates must be based upon fully consolidated group risks, and 
effective supervisory devices need to be introduced to avoid inadvertent extension of public safety 
net to cross-sectoral activities of financial conglomerates. It is also critical to strengthen internal 
control and risk management capacities at financial conglomerates, and to establish strong market 
discipline by improving information transparency and monitoring incentives in the financial market. 
 
 
 
 
  
본 논문은 외환위기 이후 빠르게 진전되
어 온 금융 대형화, 그룹화 현상이 개별 금
융기관과 시장 전반의 시스템 리스크에 미
치는 영향에 대하여 분석하였다. 실증분석
결과에 따르면, 위기 이후 독립 금융기관과
비교하여 금융그룹 소속 금융기관의 도산위
험이 대체로 낮은 것으로 나타나며, 겸업화
효과보다는 대형화에 의한 수익성 및 수익
변동성 개선효과가 유의하게 나타나는 것으
로 분석되었다. 따라서 아직까지 우리나라
에서 고위험 추구를 통한 대형 금융그룹의
위험상승 현상은 관측되지 않고 있다. 그러
나 대형 은행그룹 간 직간접적 상호의존도
가 높아짐에 따라 시스템 위험의 발생 가능
성이 증대되고, 겸업화로 비은행부문 및 
자본시장으로부터의 위험전이 가능성도 
높아지고 있어 이에 대한 정책대응이 요
구된다. 특히 금융그룹을 하나의 동일체
로 인식하고 그룹단위로 건전성 규제 등
을 실시하는 위험 중심의 연결감독체제
가 확립될 필요가 있으며, 겸업화로 인한 
공적 안전망의 확대를 효과적으로 차단
하기 위한 감독장치도 마련될 필요가 있
다. 아울러 금융그룹의 내부통제 및 위험
관리체제를 강화하고, 경영투명성의 제고
를 통해 금융그룹에 대한 시장의 모니터
링 기능도 확충할 필요가 있다. 
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I. Introduction 
 
 
The structure of the Korean financial services industry has been rapidly 
transformed since the 1997 financial crisis. Initially driven by the government 
restructuring program, the combined trends of financial consolidation, 
conglomeration and internationalization not only caused a dramatic change in the 
competition structure but also significantly eroded the effectiveness of existing 
regulatory regime in maintaining financial stability. Integration among traditionally 
separated financial services and the emergence of a few large financial 
conglomerates have brought about a fundamental shift in the nature of financial 
risks embedded in the financial system.  
While it is required to understand the evolving nature and structure of risks 
implied in the new financial regime, a clear-cut relationship between financial 
consolidation and financial stability does not exist. Indeed, financial consolidation 
may increase or decrease risks of individual financial conglomerates. With scale and 
scope economies, and benefited from increased market power, financial 
conglomerates may be able to enhance profitability thereby containing financial risks. 
However, complexity in operation and incentives to take on more risks based upon 
‘too-big-to-fail’ may actually increase financial risks of large conglomerates.  
Financial consolidation and conglomeration may also increase systemic risk 
potential. Incentives of financial markets as well as regulatory authorities in 
monitoring and supervising large conglomerates can be significantly undermined. 
Even if individual conglomerates are able to benefit from diversification, 
interdependency and mutual exposure among large financial conglomerates may 
substantially increase as they share homogeneous business portfolios and asset 
structure. 
In the face of the increasingly limited ability of supervisory and monetary 
authorities to cope with financial risks, it has become an urgent task to devise a new 
regulatory regime capable of preventing excessive risk-taking of financial 
conglomerates and regulatory forbearance of financial supervisors. It is also required 
to create an environment where market participants have a strong incentive to 
monitor risks and penalize financial institutions if they take on too much risk.  
Given the imperatives of the supervisory and regulatory reform in the face of on-
going consolidation and conglomeration, we address following inquiries in the 
present paper: How can we characterize the financial consolidation process that has 
accelerated during the post-crisis period in Korea? What is the evolving nature of 
risks associated with financial consolidation and conglomeration? Do large financial 
conglomerates composed of various financial businesses differ significantly from the 
institutions running a single business in terms of risk characteristics? If so, in what 
manner should the risks of financial conglomerates be contained and managed? 
How should the system-wide risk that may be amplified to ignite systemic crises be 
classified, observed, and responded to? What is the nature of the financial safety net 
in which the perverse incentives of market participants as well as financial regulators 
can be curbed to reinforce both financial stability and efficiency?  
The present paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes the post-crisis 
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financial restructuring program and characterizes the development in financial 
consolidation and conglomeration in Korean financial industries. This section also 
analyses the shift in financial industry structure by examining the degree of 
concentration. Section 3 presents a conceptual framework as well as empirical 
analyses in order to understand risk implications of financial conglomeration in 
Korea. This section explores potential risk impacts by focusing on the channels 
through which financial consolidation may influence financial risks of individual 
conglomerates and systemic risk potential. We conduct regression analyses to 
explore possible linkages between financial conglomeration and profitability as well 
as firm risk of financial institutions. Section 4 outlines current regulatory framework 
of financial supervision for financial conglomerates in Korea. Finally, section 5 
discusses policy implications and suggestions. 
 
 
II. The Rise of Financial Conglomerates in Korea 
 
 
Since the onset of the 1997 financial crisis, the Korean financial industry has seen 
the rise of financial conglomerates as well as massive consolidation and 
concentration.  Prior to the crisis in Korea, there had existed two types of financial 
groups. One is the “financial conglomerate”1 whose business lines were exclusively 
in financial activities, in which their organizational structure took the form of a 
parent’s participation in financial subsidiaries (parent-subsidiary model) which was 
partly allowed in the mid 1980s.2 However, financial institutions in Korea were 
prohibited from establishing financial holding companies(FHCs)3; in that financial 
activity among financial institutions were strictly separated for fears that financial 
concentration through holding companies would lead to side effects including the 
potential for anti-competitive behavior. Later on, as will be mentioned in the 
proceeding section, financial holding companies were introduced in Korea following 
the crisis as a part of the government’s restructuring efforts.  
Another form of financial group prevalent in Korea has been the “mixed 
conglomerate,” which is predominantly commercially oriented, but contains at least 
one regulated non-bank financial institution (NBFI). In Korea, many NBFIs are 
owned by the chaebols (large family-owned conglomerates). According to the Fair 
Trade Commission, the amount of assets for 10 largest mixed conglomerates totaled 
about 172 trillion won as of April 2005, of which Samsung’s share of assets totaled 
about 110 trillion won, or 64%. Figure 1 shows the ownership structure of Samsung 
Group. As can be seen, the group ownership structure is characterized by two  
                                                 
1  According to the Tripartite Group of bank, securities and insurance regulators (the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO) and the International Association of Insurance Supervision (IAIS)), the term “financial 
conglomerate” would be used to refer to “any group of companies under common control whose exclusive or 
predominant activities consist of providing significant services in at least two different financial sectors (banking, 
securities, insurance).” (Joint Forum on Financial Conglomerates, ‘Supervision of Financial 
Conglomerates,’ 1999) 
2 Korean banks have been permitted to own securities companies as subsidiaries since 1984. 
3 Financial holding companies are defined as entities that control regulated financial intermediaries: 
typically depository institutions, insurance companies, or securities firms. (Howell Jackson, 1997) 
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[Figure 1] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Figure 1] Ownership Structure of Samsung Group 
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<Table 1> Financial Institutions Closed or Merged 
    (As of June 2003, unit: number of institution) 
Type of Resolution 
 
Total No. of 
Institutions 
(end-1997) 
(A) 
License 
Revoked Merger Others
1) Subtotal
(B) 
Ratio(%)
(B/A) 
New 
Entry 
Total No. of 
Institutions 
(end of June 
2003) 
Banks    33  5 10 -  15 45.5  1 19 
Merchant Bank  
Corporations     30 22  6 -  28 93.3  1 3 
Securities Companies    36  5  3  2  10 27.8 18 44 
Insurance Companies    50  8  6  2  16 32.0 13 47 
Investment Trust  
Companies    31  6  1 -   7 23.3  9 32 
Mutual Savings and 
Finance Companies   231 100 27  1 128 55.4 12 115 
Credit Unions 1,666  2 106 463 571 34.3  9 1,104 
Leasing Companies    25 9  1  1  12 48.0  4 17 
Total 2,101 157 161 469 787 37.5 67 1,381 
  Note: 1) Includes dissolution and asset transfers to bridge institutions. 
     Source: Public Fund Management Committee, Ministry of Finance and Economy, White Paper on Public 
Fund. 
 
 
major holding companies and circular equity subscription. Everland is functioning as 
a virtual holding company, which governs Electronics through Life Insurance. 
Samsung Life Insurance in turn functions as a financial holding company that 
governs other non-bank financial institutions.  
During the restructuring process following the crisis, a number of insolvent 
financial institutions were closed or merged with other institutions. Indeed, as can 
be seen in Table 1, the number of financial institutions in Korea fell from 2,101 in 
1997 to 1,381 by the end of June 2003, a drop of 34.3%. Among the 787 financial 
institutions that underwent restructuring, 161 institutions were merged during the 
same period. In particular, the number of banks sharply decreased to 19 by the end 
of June 2003 from 33 in 1997 through closures and mergers ⎯ Korea had never 
once experienced such a dramatic turn of events, which led to the resolution of 
major financial institutions. In the case of NBFIs, 28 merchant banking corporations 
(MBCs), 10 securities companies, 7 investment trust companies (ITCs), and 16 
insurance companies had been closed down through exits or mergers by the end of 
June 2003. 
 
 
1. Resolution of Distressed Institutions and Financial Consolidation 
  
At the time of the crisis, many Korean financial institutions were significantly 
undercapitalized. Because of large non-performing loans (NPLs) and weak capital 
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base, troubled Korean banks struggled to improve their BIS capital adequacy ratios 
by curtailing lending as raising new capital was virtually impossible. Such financial 
implosion further intensified already severe credit crunch and resulted in massive 
corporate bankruptcies. Under these circumstances, the top priority in financial 
restructuring was the disposal of NPLs and the recapitalization of banks.  
The first policy response by the Korean government was to identify insolvent 
financial institutions and resolve them. In January 1998, the government nationalized 
two major banks ⎯ the Korea First Bank and Seoul Bank ⎯ that had become 
insolvent. Moreover, the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) ordered twelve 
other banks that had capital adequacy ratios of less than 8 percent at the end of 1997 
to prepare rehabilitation plans by April 1998. In June 1998, five banks were identified 
as being insolvent and their rehabilitation plans were rejected by the FSC following a 
comprehensive review of their financial conditions. Each of these banks was 
acquired through P&A (Purchase and Assumptions) agreement by relatively healthy 
banks (See Figure 2).4   
The plans of the other seven banks with capital adequacy ratios below 8 percent 
at the end of 1997 were given tentative approval to continue operations under the 
condition that those banks would pursue cost reductions through branch closures 
and staff downsizing. In addition, the government offered support by recapitalizing 
the seven banks and purchasing their impaired assets. As little progress was being 
made in the restructuring, the government stepped in by encouraging the mergers of 
the troubled banks. As such, in January 1999, two major banks, Korea Commercial 
Bank and Hanil Bank merged to form Hanvit Bank, and again in July 1999, another 
major bank, Chohung Bank acquired two regional banks: Kangwon Bank and 
Chungbuk Bank.5 
At the same time, bank mergers not directly led by the supervisory authority 
were also undertaken. With support from the government, in January 1999, 
Kookmin Bank merged ailing Korea Long-Term Credit Bank, which enabled them to 
achieve synergy between Kookmin’s wide retail network and Korea Long-Term 
Credit’s corporate finance. In addition, Hana Bank also merged Boram Bank amid 
the wave of consolidation. Note that both Korea Long-Term Credit Bank and Boram 
Bank had been showing a possibility of significant undercapitalization and, without 
the mergers, corrective supervisory actions would have been inevitable.  
The bank consolidation trend was marked in April 2001 with the merger of 
Korea’s two large banks — the Kookmin Bank, the largest by asset size, and the 
Korea Housing & Commercial Bank, the third largest. The merger, which created the 
largest bank in Korea, was the first bank merger between healthy banks in genuine 
sense. In fact, as of the end of 2003, the Kookmin Bank’s assets totaled 214.8 trillion 
won, accounting for nearly 27% of total assets in the banking sector. Furthermore, in 
December 2002, Seoul Bank, which had been nationalized following the crisis and 
unable to find any strategic investors, ultimately merged with Hana Bank. 
                                                 
4 The suspended banks and their respective acquirers are as follows: Daedong Bank by Kookmin 
Bank, Dongnam Bank by Korea Housing & Commercial Bank, Dongwha Bank by Shinhan Bank, 
Chungchung Bank by Hana Bank, and Kyungki Bank by KorAm Bank. 
5 Among the seven troubled banks, only Korea Exchange Bank was not merged but received a 
capital injection from Commerzbank.   
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[Figure 2] Consolidation of Korean Banking Industry Following the Crisis 
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<Table 2> Affiliates of Financial Group in Korea 
(As of September 2003, unit: number of institution) 
  Bank Insurance Securities ITC Card Others Total 
Woori 3 0 1 1 0 0 5 
Shinhan 3 1 1 2 1 1 9 
Dongwon 0 0 1 1 0 2 4 
Financial 
Holding 
Company 
Subtotal 6 1 3 4 1 3 18 
Banking 8 2 2 4 1 8 25 
Insurance 0 3 1 2 0 1 7 
Securities 0 1 9 7 0 3 20 
 Financial 
Conglomerate 
Parent- 
Subsidiary 
Model 
Subtotal 8 6 12 13 1 12 52 
Samsung 0 2 1 1 1 2 7 
LG 0 0 1 1 1 2 5 
SK 0 1 1 1 0 1 4 
Others 0 7 7 6 2 13 35 
Mixed Conglomerate 
Subtotal 0 10 10 9 4 18 51 
Total 14 17 25 26 6 33 121 
Source: Choi (2004), Establishment of the Korean Supervisory System for Financial Conglomerates. 
  
In the meantime, to deal with the other weak banks, the government enacted 
Financial Holding Company Act in October 2000, and created a financial holding 
company in April 2001. Under a holding company structure, numerous synergy 
effects can be achieved such as enabling the cross selling of financial products, 
lowering funding costs, and streamlining IT investment. At the same time, the 
government hoped that affiliated companies would be able to retain their client base 
while being able to avoid employee downsizing, further helping to lessen employee 
resistance, in contrast to the P&A approach used in 1998.  
At first, two nation-wide banks (Hanvit and Peace) and two regional banks 
(Kwangju and Kyungnam) were placed under a government-run holding company, 
Woori Financial Holdings. Before doing so, the NPLs of candidate banks were 
disposed, and in addition, public funds were injected to raise their capital adequacy 
ratios above 10 percent. Aside from the banks, a securities company, an ITC, and a 
credit card company6 were placed under the Woori financial holding company.  
                                                 
6 In 2003, Woori Credit Card Company experiencing financial distress under a pile of NPLs was 
acquired by Woori Bank. According to the OECD report (1993), under a financial holding company, a 
bank’s relation to non-bank affiliates is indirect as there exists a cushion ⎯ a holding company ⎯ 
between them. Because the legal separation is more extensive than in the case of the parent-subsidiary 
model, the cost of producing a given mix of products tends to be more expensive. However, it is often 
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<Table 3> Fiscal Support for Financial Restructuring (11/1997 ~ 6/2003) 
(Unit: trillion won) 
KDIC and Others KAMCO  
Recapitalization  Capital Contribution 
Deposit 
Repayment 
Purchase 
of Assets 
Purchase 
of NPLs  
Total 
Banks 34.0 13.7 0 14.0 24.6 86.2 
NBFIs 26.3 3.3 29.8 0.3 14.5 74.2 
Merchant 
Banking 
Corporations 
2.7 0.2 17.2 0.0 1.6 21.7 
Insurance 
Companies 15.9 2.9 0.0 0.3 1.8 21.0 
Securities and 
ITCs 7.7 0.0 0.01 0.0 8.5 16.2 
Mutual 
Savings Banks 0.0 0.2 7.9 0.0 0.2 8.2 
Credit 
Cooperatives 0.0 0.0 4.7 0.0 0.0 4.7 
 
Others 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.4 2.4 
Total 60.3 17.0 29.8 14.3 39.1 160.4 
Source: Public Fund Management Committee, Ministry of Finance and Economy, White Paper on Public Fund. 
 
 
Then, in September 2001, a second financial holding company was established, 
Shinhan Financial Holdings, under which Shinhan and Cheju Banks along with a life 
insurance company, a securities company, an ITC, and a credit card company were 
placed under the same umbrella. In September 2003, Chohung Bank, the fourth 
largest bank at the end of 2002, was also placed under the Shinhan Financial 
Holdings, making it the second largest financial group in Korea.78   
In tandem with these measures for the resolution of weak or insolvent institutions, 
the government injected a total of 160.4 trillion won (26 percent of GDP) in fiscal 
resources to rehabilitate the financial system from the late 1997 until the end of June 
2003 (see Table 3). The operating arms of the government in this regard were the 
                                                                                                                            
argued that, because of the indirect relationship, the safety and soundness of the bank can be more 
isolated from the non-bank affiliates and the bank may have less incentive to bail out a faltering non-bank 
affiliate. In practice, the opposite can be said to be true, as non-bank affiliates in distress tends to be 
rescued, mainly for the purpose of protecting group’s reputation. This is the case for the Woori Credit 
Card Company, and as a result, the Woori Bank’s access to official safety net has been indirectly extended 
to the non-bank subsidiary. 
7 In 2003, another financial holding company, Dongwon Financial Holdings, was established.  
However, unlike Woori and Shinhan Financial Holdings, only NBFIs were placed under this holding 
company.  
8 Recent developments in the Korean banking industry since June 2003 are the following: Koram 
bank was acquired by Citibank in November 2004, and the Korea First Bank was acquired by Standard 
Chartered Bank in January 2005. Recently in December 2005, Hana Financial Holdings, the fourth 
financial holding company group in Korea, was launched controlling four major subsidiaries – Hana 
Bank, Daehan Investment Securities, Hana Institute of Finance, and Hana INS. 
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Korea Asset Management Corporation (KAMCO) and the Korea Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (KDIC). Out of the total amount of fiscal support, 60.3 trillion won was 
used for recapitalization, 39.1 trillion won for the purchase of NPLs, and 29.8 trillion 
won for the deposit repayments for closed institutions. The recapitalization of 
financial institutions using public money left a substantial share of the banking 
sector in the hands of the government.9   
 
 
2. Concentration of the Financial Industry in Korea 
 
As a result of the government-led financial restructuring after the financial crisis, 
which brought about massive consolidation, market concentration increased 
significantly in Korea’s banking industry. To determine the degree of market 
concentration in Korea’s banking industry, we use two kinds of measures. The first is 
the so-called k–th bank concentration ratio (CRk) which takes the market shares of the 
first to the k–th largest banks in the market. The second index we use is the 
Herfindhal-Hirshman Index (HHI)10, which is calculated by summing the squares of 
the individual percent market shares of all the participants in a market. Total assets 
are taken as the measure of bank size.  
As a result of the consolidation trend in the banking industry, market 
concentration increased significantly, in a large part due to the merger of Korea’s two 
large banks, Kookmin Bank and Korea Housing & Commercial Bank. In terms of 
CR3, the ratio rose substantially to 53.2% in 2003 from 28.4% in 1997, as can be seen 
in Figure 3-1.  Similarly, the HHI index showed a sharp increase from 664 in 1997 to 
1,497 by the end of 2003, which is considered as being “moderately concentrated.” 
Figures 3-2 and 3-3 show the changes in the concentration ratios of the life-
insurance industry and securities industry, respectively. According to the HHI index, 
Korea’s life-insurance industry is considered as being “highly concentrated” with 
HHI exceeding 2,500, even with Daehan life-insurance company losing market share 
after the crisis, Samsung and Kyobo life-insurance companies were able to maintain 
an oligopolistic market structure, as the industry saw a reduction in the number of 
smaller sized companies. As for the securities industry, though a number of firms 
were closed, there were also a sizable number of new entries, which allowed the 
industry to maintain a competitive market environment.   
Lastly, in considering the entire financial industry, Figure 3-4 shows the changes 
in the concentration ratio of the financial groups instead of individual financial 
entities. According to the HHI index, although there was a steady increase in the 
index from 405 in 1997 to 800 in 2003 reflecting the emergence of financial 
conglomerates following the financial crisis, the level of market concentration is still 
considered as being competitive.   
                                                 
9 Indeed, KDIC currently owns Woori Financial Holdings Company with 86.8% ownership, which 
includes Woori, Kwangju, and Kyongnam Banks, all of three are 100% owned by the Woori Financial 
Holding Company.  
10 Regulators assessing the effect of mergers on concentration in local financial markets typically rely 
on HHI. U.S. Department of Justice divides the spectrum of market concentration into three categories: 
“not concentrated” (HHI below 1,000), “moderately concentrated” (HHI between 1,000 and 1,800), and 
highly concentrated (HHI above 1,800). 
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[Figure 3-1] Concentration Ratio of the Korean Banking Industry (based on assets) 
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[Figure 3-2] Concentration Ratio of the Korean Life-Insurance Industry 
(based on assets) 
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[Figure 3-3] Concentration Ratio of the Korean Securities Industry (based on assets) 
 
 
[Figure 3-4] Concentration Ratio of the Korean Financial Group (based on assets) 
   Source:  Bank of Korea (2004). 
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III. Financial Consolidation and Changing Risks 
 
 
1. Conceptual Framework 
 
As described above, the financial consolidation in Korea encompasses both 
consolidation of large financial institutions through mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As) within the same financial industry, and cross-industry conglomeration 
among bank and non-bank financial institutions - either in the form of parent-
subsidiary model or of financial holding company structure. Note that these two 
types of consolidations often occur simultaneously and banks are in general at the 
center of the consolidation process. As a result, a few large bank-centered financial 
groups have emerged, within which various non-bank financial institutions are 
clustered around a large bank. Henceforth, in this section, we explore risk 
implications of the typical bank-centered financial conglomeration without explicitly 
distinguishing bank consolidation from cross-industry conglomeration. 
Before we examine the implications of financial consolidation on financial risks, it 
would be informative to explore the relationship between financial efficiency and 
stability. Traditional literature often suggests that there exists a potential tradeoff 
between financial efficiency and stability. Specifically, while large banks with 
increased market power may potentially undermine competition and efficiency of 
resource allocation, large banks can be more profitable and financially robust, which 
promotes financial stability. For instance, Keeley (1990) found that the erosion of 
market power due to increased competition led to higher default risk premium and 
lower capital ratios for U.S. banks in the 1980s. He argued that, with asymmetric 
information and provision of bank deposit insurance, lower charter values led to 
higher risk and failure rate of banks due to moral hazard and agency problem.11 In 
retrospect, the bank restructuring policy in Korea during the post-crisis period 
seemed to be based upon this charter value hypothesis, that is, the implied trade-off 
between competition and stability. In an effort to promote bank profitability and 
financial stability, mergers between insolvent banks and creation of large leading 
banks were often an explicit policy objective of the government authorities. 
Recent research, however, indicates that one cannot ascertain a clear-cut 
relationship between consolidation and financial stability challenging the traditional 
view. First, according to a group of research, financial concentration may not always 
create market power for large institutions.12 Indeed, even with few participants, 
financial markets can be sufficiently contestable.13  
                                                 
11 For instance, the view that the erosion of bank market power is associated with financial 
instability can also be found in Marcus (1984). 
12 G10 report (2001) suggested that consolidation of US banking organizations had only minor 
effects on market power because most M&As did not increase local concentration in a significant way, 
and because antitrust authorities, potential market entrants, deregulation and advances in technology 
increased the degree of competition. 
13 Allen and Gale (2000) showed that, under search cost, a branch banking system with only two 
nation-wide banks can lead to a perfectly competitive pricing, while the system with multiple unitary 
banks may lead to monopoly pricing. Also, contrary to the result of Bikker and Haaf (2000), which 
reported a negative relationship between concentration and degree of competition, Claessens and Laeven 
(2003) found that bank concentration is only weakly correlated with the degree of competition as 
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<Table 4> Financial Consolidation and Financial Risks 
Types of Risk Channels Factors 
Profitability and  
Cost Efficiency 
- Scale and scope efficiencies 
- Market power rents 
Earnings Variability - Geographic diversification - Product diversification 
Operational Risk 
- Complexity in business  
- Organizational diseconomies 
- Difficulties in monitoring / control 
- Heterogeneity in culture 
- Difficulties of harmonizing risk management 
Financial Risk of 
Individual 
Conglomerate 
Risk Preference - Moral hazard based upon TBTF 
Effectiveness of Supervision,
Monitoring and Market 
Discipline 
- Regulatory forbearance 
- Concentration and difficulty of 
 orderly workouts 
- Opacity and information asymmetry 
Direct Interdependencies 
- Short-term inter-bank lending 
- Medium and long-term loans 
- OTC derivatives transactions 
Indirect Interdependencies 
- Homogeneous balance sheet structure 
- Homogeneous business / profit structure 
- Common exposure to market risks 
Systemic Risk 
Potential 
Contagion from Integration, 
Alliance and Reputation, 
De facto Extension of Public 
Safety Net 
- Risks from non-bank subsidiaries 
- Risks from strategic alliance with 
 non-financial companies 
- Exposure to foreign and capital market shocks 
 
 
Second, even though we admit that large financial conglomerates can reduce 
financial risks benefiting from increased market power and diversification of their 
geographic and business portfolios, various features of conglomeration may actually 
increase the scope for instability, in particular when they lead to a small number of 
large ‘national champions,’ which are too big and few to fail, to discipline, and to 
liquidate. 
It may be a challenging task to systematically characterize and classify potential 
channels through which financial consolidation and conglomeration has impact on the 
risk and stability of a financial system. Following the spirit of G10 report (2001) and De 
Nicolo et al. (2003), we distinguish financial risks of individual financial conglomerates 
on a standalone basis from systemic risk potential for the financial system as a whole. 
In this regard, the conceptual framework we employ in investigating risk implications 
of financial consolidation and conglomeration is summarized in Table 4.14  
                                                                                                                            
measured by H-statistics. Rather, they argued that it is foreign bank participation and low entry barrier 
that fosters competitive pricing. 
14  Hahm and Hong (2003) provided a diagnostic analysis on the risk implications of bank 
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A. Risk of Individual Financial Conglomerates 
 
Financial risks of individual conglomerates can be impacted through four 
conceptually distinctive channels - expected earnings, variability of earnings, 
operational risk and risk preference of individual conglomerates. First, profitability 
and earnings potential would be enhanced for large financial conglomerates if they 
can exploit and realize the scale and scope economies. For instance, financial 
conglomerates can achieve cost saving by spreading out large fixed cost required in 
IT investment over larger asset base. Subsidiaries in a financial group can also share 
marketing and distribution channels as well as database and IT systems. Financial 
consolidation and conglomeration can lead to revenue enhancement if increased size 
raises market power and if product diversity and cross-selling increases profit 
opportunities. With enhanced profitability and cost efficiency, insolvency risk of 
individual conglomerates would be reduced, ceteris paribus. Note also that 
increased profitability and higher charter value would lessen moral hazard incentive 
of large conglomerates.15  
Second, financial consolidation and conglomeration may lower risk of individual 
financial conglomerates with greater opportunities for risk diversification. 
Geographic consolidation would yield a potential for risk diversification if merged 
financial firms operate in heterogeneous markets and are expected to show relatively 
low or negative return correlations. In a similar vein, cross-industry financial 
consolidation may also contribute to reductions in earnings variability by facilitating 
product diversification if expected returns are sufficiently heterogeneous across 
different financial services. On the other hand, as noted by Cumming and Hirtle 
(2001), the risk faced by a financial conglomerate could be larger than the sum of 
risks of each subsidiaries if the volatility of a subsidiary is affected by the actions of 
other subsidiaries.16 
Third, while large conglomerates may be able to benefit from the scale and scope 
economies and risk diversification, operational risk may substantially increase with 
                                                                                                                            
consolidation for Korean banking industry. This section is mainly based upon the analytical framework 
of Hahm and Hong (2003).    
15 Empirical evidence is mixed for the argument that large banks are more efficient and more 
profitable. For instance, Berger et al. (1999), Hughes and Mester (1998) reported the existence of a 
significant scale economy in the U.S. banking industry. Numerous authors such as Hannan (1991) and 
Calem and Carlino (1991) also supported the positive association between bank size and market power 
measured, for instance, by higher lending rate, lower deposit rate, and higher profitability. Craig and 
Santos (1997) found that profitability increased and risk decreased after the mergers of U.S. bank holding 
companies. However, there also exists counter evidence. Boyd and Runkle (1993) reported that there was 
no significant positive relationship between Tobin’s q and the size of US bank holding companies. Also, 
Akhavein et al. (1997) and Chamberlain (1998) reported that profitability had not significantly improved 
for banks that had undergone M&As. 
16 In general, empirical evidence seems to be relatively favorable for the existence of geographic 
diversification effect. For instance, Benston et al. (1995) found that the motivation for mergers in the U.S. 
in the 80s was mainly risk diversification effect rather than the exploitation of the deposit insurance put 
option value. Hughes et al. (1996) found that well diversified interstate banks could reduce insolvency 
risks. Craig and Santos (1997) found lower default risks as measured by the z-score and lower stock 
return volatilities for merged bank holding companies. Demsets and Strahan (1997) also argued that large 
banks had lower stock return volatility if their portfolios were held constant. As for the product 
diversification, empirical evidence is more limited. For instance, the studies of Kwast (1989), Boyd et al. 
(1993), and Kwan (1997), among others, imply that there exists a relatively limited potential for product 
diversification benefits.  
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growing organizational complexity, inefficiencies in management and internal 
control, heterogeneous culture among subsidiaries, and difficulties of harmonizing 
risk management, etc. Indeed, large and complex financial conglomerates may no 
longer be able to understand exact nature of their risks. 
Finally, financial consolidation and resulting dominance of a few large financial 
conglomerates can bring about moral hazard for financial conglomerates especially if 
they believe they are too big to fail (TBTF). The emergence of a small number of large 
financial conglomerates creates an incentive for regulatory forbearance because the 
failure of a large conglomerate will threaten the stability of the entire financial 
system. In turn, this creates a perverse incentive for financial market participants in 
monitoring financial conglomerates and penalizing them for taking on excessive 
risks. Possibilities of regulatory forbearance and weakening market discipline cause 
moral hazard of large conglomerates, which makes them take risks more 
aggressively. Note also that, based upon TBTF, risks will be under-priced for large 
conglomerates and this implicit subsidy provides further incentives toward 
additional consolidation and conglomeration. All in all, financial conglomerates may 
have incentives to pursue riskier investments, and more aggressive risk taking may 
offset the risk reduction effects potentially achievable through revenue enhancement 
and diversification.17 
 
B. Systemic Risk Potential 
 
As summarized in Table 4, financial consolidation and conglomeration has 
potentially significant implications not only for the risk of individual conglomerates 
but also for systemic risk potential. As discussed above, the dominance of a small 
number of large financial conglomerates that are too big and few to fail and 
increased concentration of the financial industry around these large conglomerates 
could significantly increase systemic risk potential. Note also that the emergence of 
TBTF institutions would undermine the effectiveness of financial supervision and 
market monitoring. As a result, excessive risk taking and moral hazard of large 
financial institutions may lead to higher systemic risk potential.  
Even in the absence of the incentive problems, increasing complexity of financial 
conglomerates would make it more difficult for regulators and market participants 
to comprehend risks and take early corrective actions. Belated recognition of the 
problems due to information opacity in turn increases incentives for regulatory 
forbearance, and sudden disclosure of the problems and possible disorders in the 
                                                 
17 A group of research investigated potential effects of financial consolidation on the risk profile of 
large financial institutions. While Boyd and Runkle (1993) and Craig and Santos (1997) reported risk 
reduction effect of bank mergers, Chong (1991) found that interstate consolidation actually increased 
stock return volatility based upon an event study of U.S. bank mergers. Boyd and Gertler (1993) also 
reported a similar incentive effect for more risk taking of large banks using U.S. data. In a similar vein, 
Demsets and Strahan (1997) argued that financial risks of large banks were not necessarily low as they 
expanded risky loan portfolios exploiting the diversification effect. De Nicolo (2000) found that default 
risks of large banks measured by z-score index actually increased with bank size not only for U.S. banks 
but also for European and Japanese banks, which implies more aggressive risk taking of large institutions. 
De Nicolo et al. (2003) also reported evidence that z-score index was systematically lower and thus 
default risk was higher for both financial conglomerates and large financial firms based upon the data for 
world largest 500 financial firms. 
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resolution of large ailing conglomerates may cause a serious system-wide disruption. 
Increasing degree of interdependence among the large and complex financial 
conglomerates also implies higher potential for systemic risk. The Group of 10 
Ferguson report (2001) indicates that areas of direct interdependency that are most 
associated with consolidation include mutual credit risk exposures through inter-
bank loans, on and off-balance sheet activities such as financial derivatives, and from 
the payment and settlement relationships. The systemic risk potential may also 
increase if large conglomerates are simultaneously and similarly exposed to adverse 
shocks. While financial conglomerates are able to diversify within each group, they 
are getting more homogeneous as business areas as well as asset and profit 
structures become increasingly similar. Resulting indirect interdependencies among 
large conglomerates raise systemic risk potential as well. 18  Finally, financial 
conglomeration may aggravate the problem of systemic risk as banks expand their 
involvement in high risk activities that are closely tied to non-bank financial firms 
and capital markets. As a result, banking institutions would be more vulnerable to 
contagion risks from non-bank and non-financial sectors as well as capital markets. 
The use of identical brand name for affiliated non-bank subsidiaries may also erode 
firewall within a conglomerate and increases pressure for both managers and 
financial regulators to protect affiliated non-bank subsidiaries. The shift of financial 
savings from bank deposits to affiliated non-bank financial subsidiaries also implies 
de facto extension of public safety net.  
 
 
2. Diagnostic Analysis of Risk Implications 
 
A. Risk of Individual Financial Conglomerates 
 
As discussed above, financial consolidation and conglomeration may increase or 
decrease financial risks of individual financial conglomerates. With the scale and 
scope economies financial conglomerates may be able to enhance profitability 
thereby reducing financial risks. However, increasing complexity in operation and 
incentives to take on more risks based upon moral hazard may actually increase 
financial risk of large conglomerates on a net basis. As there exists no comprehensive 
measure of financial risks readily observable, rather than directly quantifying the 
risks of financial conglomerates, this section focuses on the respective channels 
outlined in Table 4 to explore the potential implications of financial consolidation 
and conglomeration.  
                                                 
18  G10 report (2001) suggests that interdependencies among large and complex banking 
organizations have increased over the last decade in the U.S. and Japan and began to increase in Europe. 
De Nicolo and Kwast (2002) investigated the systemic risk potential presented in the U.S. banking 
industry over the period of 1988-99 based upon correlation measures of stock returns of large and 
complex banking organizations, and found a positive consolidation elasticity of stock return correlations. 
They interpreted the evidence as suggesting that the systemic risk potential increased with consolidation 
in the banking industry. As for the cross-country studies, empirical evidence is mixed. Beck et al. (2003), 
using a logit model, found that banking crises were less likely in countries with a more concentrated 
banking system. On the other hand, De Nicolo et al. (2003) reported that the aggregate z-score index 
obtained from the top 5 banks in each country was significantly negatively associated with the degree of 
bank concentration. That is, bank consolidation is positively associated with the systemic risk potential.   
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a. Scope of Geographic Diversification 
To promote financial stability through geographic diversification, sufficient 
heterogeneity is required across regional markets so that idiosyncratic risks may be 
diversified away. To diagnose the scope of geographic diversification over business 
cycle, we investigated degree of correlations among regional industrial productions. 
Figure 4 shows the trend in the average cross-correlation among major cities and 
provinces in Korea from January 1992 to September 2002.19 The average correlation 
coefficient turned out to be positive and less than 0.5 except in the period of 1999.6 - 
2001.6, indicating that the potential scope of geographic diversification would be in 
general limited. However, it is noteworthy that the correlation shows a cyclical 
pattern with relatively low correlations in business cycle recessions. This implies that 
geographically well-diversified financial conglomerates would suffer less from the 
adverse impact of recessions on the asset quality and profitability. 
For more direct evidence on the scope of geographic diversification, we 
investigated historical profitability of Korean regional banks. As shown in Table 5, 
earnings of regional banks measured in return on equities (ROEs) for Jeonbuk-
Kwangju, Jeonbuk-Kyongnam, Kwangju-Pusan, and Kwangju-Daegu pairs showed 
relatively low degree of correlations. This again implies that, while the 
diversification effect may not be substantial, there could be a potential benefit from 
the cross-regional consolidation among those regional bank pairs. 
 
 
[Figure 4] Average Cross-Correlation in Regional Industrial Productions 
  
Source: Hahm and Hong (2003). 
                                                 
19 At each point in time the cross-correlation matrix of industrial production indices for 14 major 
cities and provinces was computed using the prior 24 months industrial production time-series, and then, 
the average cross-correlation was obtained based on the matrix. Seasonally adjusted industrial 
production series were used. 
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<Table 5> Cross-Correlations in the Profitability of Regional Banks 
(ROAs / ROEs, 1991-2002) 
 Cheju Jeonbuk Kwangju Kyongnam Pusan 
Jeonbuk 0.93 / 0.82     
Kwangju 0.89 / 0.67 0.78 / 0.23    
Kyongnam 0.82 / 0.86 0.69 / 0.48 0.90 / 0.93   
Pusan 0.90 / 0.91 0.87 / 0.86 0.86 / 0.44 0.80 / 0.70  
Daegu 0.93 / 0.93 0.90 / 0.90 0.87 / 0.46 0.81 / 0.71 0.99 / 0.99 
Source: Hahm and Hong (2003). 
  
b. Scope of Product Diversification 
Next we focus on the scope of diversification across different financial services 
industries to explore potential benefits from conglomeration. Table 6 shows the 
cross-correlation in historical earnings measured from the yearly return on assets 
(ROAs) among three major financial industries in Korea. Note that earnings 
correlation was relatively high between commercial bank and life insurance 
industries, while other industry pairs – commercial bank and securities, and 
securities and life insurance, showed relatively low correlations. This implies that the 
alliance between bank and life insurance may be able to produce a positive synergy 
in profitability. However, it may potentially amplify earnings variability as well.  
Figure 5 shows the cross-correlation coefficients among monthly stock price 
indices of bank, securities and life insurance industries.20 It is noteworthy that the 
cross-correlation increased substantially after the financial crisis in 1997-98 implying 
a much limited potential for diversification across different financial industries in the 
post-crisis period. 
 
 
<Table 6> Cross-Correlations in ROAs of Financial Industries (1991-2001) 
 Commercial Banks Securities Companies 
Securities Companies 0.1014  
Life Insurance Companies 0.8755 0.0882 
Source: Hahm and Hong (2003). 
                                                 
20 The cross-correlation coefficient at each point in time was computed using the previous 24 month 
time-series for monthly changes in log stock price indices of three financial services industries. 
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[Figure 5] Cross-Correlations in Stock Price Indices of Financial Industries 
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c. Market Power and Increased Profitability 
As discussed above, there has been a view that consolidation increases franchise 
value and profitability of large banks and thus lowers financial risks of consolidated 
banks. This view in large part hinges upon the assumption that consolidation 
undermines competition. However, as discussed above, recent studies report 
evidence that consolidation has only minor effects on competition and market power. 
Figure 6 shows the trends in the deposit and lending interest rate spread of major 
commercial banks in Korea for new deposits and new loans extended in a month. 
Note that the significantly higher spread for relatively large leading banks such as 
Kookmin and Woori banks has actually disappeared recently as competition among 
banks became more intense. This implies that the market power effect of 
consolidation may not be significant in Korea, and hence, consolidation would not 
undermine competition due to increased contestability. 
 
d. Risk-taking and Moral Hazard 
Finally, individual financial conglomerates may have incentives to take on risks 
more aggressively based upon the expectation that they are too big and few to fail. 
Deteriorations in the monitoring capacity of supervisory authorities and financial 
markets being faced with ever-increasing complexity and information opacity of 
financial conglomerates also encourage risk-taking incentives of TBTF institutions. 
It is too early to evaluate the change in the risk-taking behavior of Korean  
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[Figure 6] Deposit-Lending Interest Rate Spreads of Major Banks 
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financial conglomerates in this regard. As noted above, bank consolidation at early 
stage in post-crisis Korea has been driven by the government’s restructuring 
initiative, and the banks intervened by the government had no freedom of taking 
risks at their own will as they were tightly monitored by the Korean Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (KDIC) and Financial Supervisory Service (FSS).  
A recent study on the risk of Korean commercial banks by Kim (2003) found that 
bank asset risk indicators such as non-current loan ratio and loan loss provision ratio 
were not significantly associated with bank size variables. However, Kim reported a 
weakly positive association between bank size and unsystematic component of stock 
return volatility, which is a more forward-looking measure of risk relative to the 
accounting measure. Kim interpreted the evidence as possibly indicating a more 
aggressive risk taking behavior of large banks. 
 
B. Systemic Risk Potential 
 
As emphasized above, financial consolidation and conglomeration may increase systemic 
risk potential as incentives of both large financial conglomerates and financial markets and 
regulatory authorities in monitoring and supervising them may also change. Even without 
distortions in incentives toward risk taking, the degree of systemic risk potential may increase 
with financial consolidation because, although the extent of diversification can increase at 
individual institutions, financial conglomerates tend to share increasingly similar 
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characteristics in their business portfolios and asset structures. Following the conceptual 
framework outlined above and in the spirit of G10 Ferguson report (2001), this section 
focuses on these risk channels and explores potential impacts on the systemic risk in Korea. 
 
a. Direct Interdependencies among Conglomerates 
One such channel of direct interdependencies is mutual exposure of large banks through 
short-term lending. Figure 7 shows the size of call loans relative to bank equity capital for top 
three and top five banking institutions in Korea since 1990. As can be seen, the ratio increased 
systematically during the post-crisis period. The rising credit risk exposure to short-term inter-
bank lending indicates a higher potential for contagion of liquidity risk and hence systemic 
risk potential. Note also that not only the level but also the variability of the call loan to bank 
equity capital ratio increased substantially after the crisis.  
While the risk exposure of large banking institutions in short-term lending 
market has increased substantially, the counter-party risk exposure through financial 
derivative transactions shows a mixed picture. Figure 8 shows the trend in the net 
position of derivative transactions for top 3 and top 5 commercial banks relative to 
bank equity capital, which does not reveal a structural increase after the financial 
crisis.  
 
 
[Figure 7] Call Loan to Bank Equity Capital Ratios 
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[Figure 8] Net Positions in Financial Derivative Transactions 
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b. Indirect Interdependencies among Conglomerates 
While diversified within respective financial conglomerates, the structure of 
balance sheet and profit strategy may become increasingly similar across financial 
conglomerates. Figure 9 shows the time-series of standard deviation in the corporate 
loan to bank asset ratios for top 5 and top 10 commercial banks in Korea since 1990. 
Note that the standard deviation fell gradually for top 10 banks. For top 5 banks, the 
standard deviation had increased during the 1998-2001 period, but then it fell 
sharply from 2002. This reflects that the competition among large banking 
institutions has become more intense in consumer and retail banking as banks that 
traditionally focused on large corporate lending gradually shifted their portfolios 
toward more household and small and medium-sized enterprise loans.  
Stock market also seems to perceive these increasing interdependencies among 
large banking institutions. Aside from direct and indirect interdependencies 
reflected in the bank balance sheet, more forward-looking stock market may better 
capture the degree of mutual exposure and linkage among conglomerates. Indeed, 
the herd behavior of depositors and financial market investors could provide 
additional source for systemic risk. Figure 10 shows the trend in the cross-correlation 
in daily stock prices of top 3 banks – Kookmin bank, Woori Financial Holdings and  
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[Figure 9] Standard Deviations in Corporate Loan to Bank Asset Ratios 
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[Figure 10] Cross-Correlations in Daily Stock Price Returns of Top 3 Banks 
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Source: Hahm and Hong (2003). 
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Shinhan bank.21 Note that the cross correlations became structurally higher from the 
second half of 2002, which implies that large banks are increasingly simultaneously 
exposed to market risk and contagion, indicating heightened systemic risk potential. 
 
 
3. Regression Analyses on the Linkage between Financial 
Conglomeration and Profitability and Risk of Financial 
Institutions 
 
Above diagnostic analyses focused on banking institutions as they are at the 
center of the current financial conglomeration trend in Korea. In this section, we 
broaden our data set to include other types of financial institutions such as securities 
and insurance corporations, and explore impacts of financial conglomeration on the 
profitability and risk taking behavior based upon the recent performance of financial 
institutions in Korea. Indeed, new business opportunities are arising for financial 
conglomerates from consolidation and diversification, which in turn influence 
profitability, capital adequacy, and risk profile of their business portfolios. As a 
result, insolvency risks of respective financial conglomerates would also change.  
To obtain measures for financial risks, we use both standard deviation on return 
on asset (ROA) and z-score index following De Nicolo et al. (2003). The z-score was 
constructed by dividing the sum of average ROA and average equity capital to asset 
ratio by standard deviation of ROA for a certain period. The z-score can be 
understood as a measure for insolvency risk since it represents the number of 
standard deviation that just wipes out mean earning plus capital. It is a measure to 
evaluate whether a firm has a sufficient amount of capital and profit-generating 
capacity against its risk-taking level. A lower value for the z-score would indicate 
that the firm is exposed to higher insolvency risk. 
In order to identify whether financial conglomeration had any structural impact on 
the behavior of financial institutions since the financial crisis, we considered both pre-
crisis (1992-96) and post-crisis (2001-03) samples. We excluded the 1997-2000 data from 
the analysis since this marked a period of massive financial restructuring including the 
resolution of NPLs and consolidation of major troubled banks. For 1992-96, our sample 
totaled 101 financial institutions including 24 commercial banks, 33 securities 
companies, 41 insurance companies, and 3 investment trust companies. For 2001-03, 
the sample totaled 118 institutions including 14 commercial banks, 34 securities 
companies, 31 insurance companies, and 39 investment trust companies. For both 
sample periods, we computed average ROA (μ), average equity capital to asset ratio (κ), 
standard deviation of ROA (σ), and z-score (z) for each financial institution. 
Financial institutions within each industry were classified into financial 
conglomerate group and non-conglomerate group. Then financial institutions in 
conglomerate group were in turn classified according to the type of financial 
conglomerate — financial holing company sub-group, parent-subsidiary sub-group, 
                                                 
21 At each point in time, we computed cross-correlation coefficient from daily stock returns during 
the last one month period. The sample period began from November 2001 when Kookmin and Korea 
Housing Bank merged into Kookmin bank. Note also that stock prices of Woori Financial Holdings were 
available only from June 2002 due to the restructuring and merger process. 
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and mixed conglomerate sub-group. 
Tables 7-1 and 7-2 report the weighted average values of the profitability, capital 
ratio, standard deviation in profitability, and insolvency risk for the entire sample as 
well as respective sub-group samples for both pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. First, 
when looking at the entire financial institutions during the post-crisis period, we find 
that financial institutions belonging to conglomerates exhibit, on average, lower 
profitability compared to independent financial institutions that do not belong to  
conglomerates.  Also, we see that conglomerate financial institutions performed 
better compared to independent non-conglomerate financial institutions, in terms of 
their capital ratio and volatility in profitability, and consequently, exhibited a higher 
z-score or lower insolvency risk.  
When examining the sample further by industry, we generally confirm the 
pattern of conglomerate institutions outperforming non-conglomerate institutions 
particularly in profit volatility and z-score. For instance, the financial institutions in 
the banking industry exhibited similar performance patterns, except in terms of 
volatility in profitability.  This larger volatility in profitability can be mostly 
attributed to the fact that the parent-subsidiary subgroup was exposed to the credit 
card boom-bust cycle since the credit card company affiliates belonged to the parent 
bank. It is interesting to note that banks of financial holding company subgroup 
showed both higher profitability and a higher z-score compared to banks of parent-
subsidiary subgroup. This indicates that banks in the parent-subsidiary group took 
on higher risks, and hence, were subject to higher insolvency risks relative to the 
banks in the financial holding company subgroup. 
Second, when we compare the performance of the entire sample across pre-crisis 
and post-crisis periods, we see that profitability improved in the post-crisis period 
while the capital ratio and volatility in profitability deteriorated in the post-crisis 
period, thereby lowering the z-score in the post-crisis period. This performance 
pattern was generally observed for both conglomerates and non-conglomerates. As 
for the relative performance of conglomerates and non-conglomerates during the 
pre-crisis period, we find that financial conglomerates somewhat outperformed 
independent financial institutions in terms of profitability, capital ratio, and volatility 
in profitability. Consequently, financial institutions of conglomerates exhibited a 
lower insolvency risk. 
Overall evidence indicates that we cannot conclude that financial conglomerates 
are taking on higher risks relative to non-conglomerate independent financial 
institutions in post-crisis Korea, the only exception being the investment trust 
industry, in which conglomerates showed a lower z-score on average. 
We now proceed to the regression analysis and investigate whether the firm size 
and conglomerate affiliation matter for profitability and risks. More specifically, we 
run the following cross-sectional regressions for four distinct dependent variables – 
ROA (μ), standard deviation of ROA (σ), equity to asset ratio (κ), and z-score (z). 
 
Yi =β0 +β1 D1i +β2 D2 i +β3 D3i +β4 Log Asseti + β5 CONG i + u i             (1) 
 
Yi =β0+β1D1i+β2D2 i+β3D3i+β4Log Asseti +β5FHi +β6 PSi +β7 MXi + u i                (2) 
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<Table 7-1> Profitability and Risks of Financial Institutions 
(weighted average values for 1992-96) 
 
Number ROA 
Equity / 
Asset 
ROA std.dev. Z-Score 
holding company 0 - - - - 
parent-subsidiary 6 0.38 5.30 0.16 56.70 
Mixed 0 - - - - 
conglo-
merates 
Subtotal 6 0.38 5.30 0.16 56.70 
Non-conglomerates 18 0.25 6.13 0.20 40.23 
Banks 
Total 24 0.32 5.68 0.18 49.21 
holding company 0 - - - - 
parent-subsidiary 10 0.52 41.87 2.58 20.35 
mixed 18 0.76 40.93 2.35 20.27 
conglo-
merates 
subtotal 28 0.69 41.21 2.41 20.29 
Non-conglomerates 5 2.43 48.06 1.25 45.14 
Securities 
total 33 0.81 41.67 2.34 21.95 
holding company 0 - - - - 
parent-subsidiary 4 -0.09 2.80 0.57 32.68 
mixed 22 -0.25 1.57 0.89 14.35 
conglo-
merates 
subtotal 26 -0.21 1.85 0.82 18.56 
Non-conglomerates 15 -1.99 4.48 3.54 2.07 
Insurance 
total 41 -0.36 2.06 1.04 17.22 
holding company 0 - - - - 
parent-subsidiary 0 - - - - 
mixed 0 - - - - 
conglo-
merates 
subtotal 0 - - - - 
Non-conglomerates 3 -0.36 -6.47 7.50 -1.09 
Investment 
Trust 
Company 
total 3 -0.36 -6.47 7.50 -1.09 
holding company 0 - - - - 
parent-subsidiary 20 0.35 6.39 0.27 53.82 
mixed 40 0.02 12.02 1.28 15.92 
conglo-
merates 
subtotal 60 0.27 7.72 0.51 44.86 
Non-conglomerates 41 0.18 6.00 0.61 37.41 
Total 
total 101 0.24 7.06 0.55 42.00 
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<Table 7-2> Profitability and Risks of Financial Institutions 
(weighted average values for 2001-2003) 
 
Number ROA
Equity /
Asset 
ROA std.dev. Z-Score 
holding company 5 0.92 4.81 0.20 37.09 
parent-subsidiary 4 0.18 4.55 0.60 13.98 
mixed 0 - - - - 
conglo-
merates 
subtotal 9 0.41 4.64 0.47 21.34 
Non-conglomerates 5 0.48 4.57 0.39 13.83 
Banks 
total 14 0.42 4.62 0.46 20.12 
holding company 2 2.55 39.29 2.14 19.72 
parent-subsidiary 4 1.24 34.59 2.29 18.29 
mixed 12 -0.80 22.87 2.27 32.15 
conglo-
merates 
subtotal 18 -0.08 26.79 2.26 28.01 
Non-conglomerates 16 1.54 18.86 5.31 11.44 
Securities 
total 34 0.27 25.05 2.93 24.38 
holding company 1 2.31 -0.21 1.51 1.39 
parent-subsidiary 3 0.78 2.93 0.53 8.41 
mixed 13 1.12 9.03 0.62 20.17 
conglo-
merates 
subtotal 17 1.07 7.54 0.61 17.29 
Non-conglomerates 14 2.29 6.14 1.25 8.18 
Insurance 
total 31 1.34 7.23 0.75 15.29 
holding company 2 6.68 90.71 2.70 43.18 
parent-subsidiary 5 12.45 89.26 5.12 22.15 
mixed 10 6.94 90.07 3.97 52.38 
conglo-
merates 
subtotal 17 8.68 89.88 4.20 41.66 
Non-conglomerates 22 6.74 93.39 3.95 57.67 
Investment 
Trust 
Company 
Total 39 7.81 91.45 4.09 48.41 
holding company 10 0.97 5.32 0.25 36.28 
parent-subsidiary 16 0.26 5.14 0.63 13.62 
mixed 35 0.78 11.86 0.94 22.51 
conglo-
merates 
subtotal 61 0.53 6.52 0.60 20.87 
Non-conglomerates 57 1.07 6.34 0.98 12.31 
Total 
Total 118 0.63 6.49 0.67 19.34 
 
 
174    韓國開發硏究 / 2006. Ⅰ  
 
In equation (1), D1, D2, D3 are dummy variables for securities, insurance and 
investment trust industries. Log Asset is the natural logarithm of total asset size and 
CONG is conglomeration dummy that equals one if the institution is affiliated with a 
financial group. In equation (2), we further refine the type of conglomerates using 
financial holdings company group dummy (FH), parent-subsidiary group dummy 
(PS), and mixed conglomerate group dummy (MX).  
Table 8 reports results on the regression analyses. It is interesting to note that, for 
the post-crisis period of 2001-03, the size variable has a significant explanatory power 
for both profitability and risk measured by the standard deviation of ROA. Larger 
financial institutions have a significantly higher profitability and lower variability in 
ROA operating on a superior efficient frontier. Compared with the results from the 
pre-crisis period, absolute values of the coefficient of firm size in both ROA and 
standard deviation regressions were larger for the post-crisis period than those for 
the pre-crisis period. Such size effect of higher profitability and lower risk seems to 
reflect the economies of scale and diversified portfolios of financial institutions 
achieved through financial consolidation. However, note also that the size variable 
does not explain z-score for both pre- and post-crisis periods, which indicates that 
larger financial institutions tend to be undercapitalized relative to their asset, 
resulting in a lower equity-asset ratio. This was particularly so during the pre-crisis 
period. 
After controlling for the size effect, it is noteworthy that financial conglomerates 
in general did not exhibit any significant differences in risk performance and 
capitalization relative to non-conglomerate independent financial institutions. 
Although the conglomerate dummy did reveal minor negative impact on the 
profitability front, these effects were only minimal. In the pre-crisis period, parent-
subsidiary group tended to show a lower profitability, while in the post-crisis period, 
mixed conglomerates showed a lower profitability.  
The weak effect of financial conglomeration on the performance of financial 
institutions suggests that Korea’s business scope regulation still takes a 
“compartmentalism” approach rather than a “universal banking” approach. 22 
Furthermore, Korea’s compartmental regulatory approach takes a positive system 
rather than a negative system. Therefore, the regulatory structure strictly limits the 
business scope of financial institutions. For instance, under Korea’s positive system, 
financial institutions can only offer financial products listed by regulatory provision. 
So if a financial product does not appear on the positive list, then financial 
institutions are prohibited from offering those unlisted products.  
Restricting our sample to bank, securities, and insurance industries by excluding 
investment trust companies yielded qualitatively similar results as reported in Table 9. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 There exist various regulations that restrict actual business cooperation among the subsidiaries 
within a financial group. For instance, fair trade and securities exchange related regulations strictly 
restrict joint business activities among subsidiaries such as joint marketing and the sharing of a common 
back office system.  
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<Table 8> 
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<Table 9> 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
<Table 8> Financial Conglomeration, Profitability and Risk: Regression Analyses 
(Bank, Securities, Insurance, and Investment Trust Industries) 
Z-Score ROA Equity/Asset ROA std.dev. 
 Pre-Crisis 
(1992~96) 
Post-Crisis 
(2001~03) 
Pre-Crisis 
(1992~96) 
Post-Crisis 
(2001~03) 
Pre-Crisis 
(1992~96) 
Post-Crisis 
(2001~03) 
Pre-Crisis 
(1992~96) 
Post-Crisis 
(2001~03) 
Log Assets 
1.10 
(0.58) 
1.03 
(0.54) 
3.18 
(1.11) 
4.13 
(1.44) 
0.24* 
(1.75) 
0.24* 
(1.79) 
1.41*** 
(3.18) 
1.42*** 
(3.19) 
-5.23*** 
(-4.32) 
-5.27*** 
(-4.35) 
-0.41 
(-0.27) 
-0.30 
(-0.20) 
-0.35** 
(-2.07) 
-0.36** 
(-2.10) 
-0.93*** 
(-2.95) 
-0.97*** 
(-3.03) 
Financial 
Conglomerate 
Dummy 
-0.95 
(-0.19) 
 
2.83 
(0.40) 
 
-0.63* 
(-1.73) 
 
-1.01 
(-0.91) 
 
-1.45 
(-0.44) 
 
-2.68 
(-0.70) 
 
 
-0.09 
(-0.19) 
 
 
-0.38 
(-0.48) 
 
 
Holding  
Company 
Dummy 
   
16.75 
(1.33) 
   
0.98 
(0.50) 
 
 
 
 
1.35 
(0.20) 
   
-1.33 
(-0.95) 
Parent- 
Subsidiary 
Dummy 
 
1.86 
(0.30) 
 
-10.03 
(-0.95) 
 
-0.85* 
(-1.94) 
 
0.64 
(0.39) 
 
0.36 
(0.09) 
 
-1.68 
(-0.29) 
 
0.18 
(0.33) 
 
-0.12 
(-0.10) 
Mixed  
Conglomerate 
Dummy 
 
-2.62 
(-0.48) 
 
3.12 
(0.39) 
 
-0.50 
(-1.27) 
 
-2.39* 
(-1.90) 
 
-2.52 
(-0.72) 
 
-4.32 
(-0.98) 
 
-0.24 
(-0.50) 
 
-0.17 
(-0.19) 
Constant 
-24.89 
(0.60) 
-23.40 
(-0.56) 
-18.78 
(-0.39) 
-34.23 
(-0.71) 
-5.73* 
(-1.93) 
-5.85** 
(-1.96) 
-18.29** 
(-2.46) 
-18.51*** 
(-2.48) 
104.15*** 
(3.89) 
105.11*** 
(3.91) 
99.84*** 
(3.90) 
98.07*** 
(3.75) 
14.80*** 
(3.95) 
14.94*** 
(3.98) 
21.77*** 
(4.12) 
22.47*** 
(4.17) 
Adj.R2 0.36 0.36 0.09 0.10 0.42 0.42 0.19 0.21 0.64 0.64 0.80 0.80 0.42 0.42 0.23 0.22 
Sample Size 101 101 118 118 101 101 118 118 101 101 118 118 101 101 118 118 
Note: t-values are in parenthesis.  ***, ** and * indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.   
 
 
 
 
<Table 9> Financial Conglomeration, Profitability and Risk: Regression Analyses 
(Bank, Securities, and Insurance Industries) 
Z-Score ROA Equity/Asset ROA std.dev. 
 Pre-Crisis 
(1992~96) 
Post-Crisis 
(2001~03) 
Pre-Crisis 
(1992~96) 
Post-Crisis 
(2001~03) 
Pre-Crisis 
(1992~96) 
Post-Crisis 
(2001~03) 
Pre-Crisis 
(1992~96) 
Post-Crisis 
(2001~03) 
Log Assets 
1.09 
(0.57) 
1.02 
(0.53) 
0.68 
(0.29) 
1.83 
(0.79) 
0.22* 
(1.71) 
0.23* 
(1.74) 
0.74** 
(2.62) 
0.82*** 
(2.89) 
-5.27*** 
(-4.34) 
-5.32*** 
(-4.37) 
-0.33 
(-0.17) 
-0.12 
(-0.06) 
-0.36** 
(-2.10) 
-0.36** 
(-2.14) 
-0.57*** 
(-2.90) 
-0.60*** 
(-2.95) 
Financial 
Conglomerate 
Dummy 
-0.94 
(-0.18) 
 
2.77 
(0.43) 
 
-0.61* 
(-1.73) 
 
-1.35* 
(-1.70) 
 
-1.39 
(-0.42) 
 
-3.59 
(-0.64) 
 
 
-0.08 
(-0.17) 
 
 
-0.20 
(-0.36) 
 
 
Holding  
Company 
Dummy 
   
21.25** 
(2.01) 
   
0.72 
(0.56) 
 
 
 
 
2.16 
(0.23) 
   
-0.84 
(-0.90) 
Parent- 
Subsidiary 
Dummy 
 
1.87 
(0.30) 
 
-4.78 
(-0.50) 
 
-0.83* 
(-1.94) 
 
-0.86 
(-0.73) 
 
0.42 
(0.11) 
 
-1.60 
(-0.19) 
 
0.19 
(0.34) 
 
-0.24 
(-0.29) 
Mixed  
Conglomerate. 
Dummy 
 
-2.61 
(-0.47) 
 
-1.76 
(-0.24) 
 
-0.48 
(-1.26) 
 
-2.29** 
(-2.56) 
 
-2.46 
(-0.70) 
 
-6.40 
(-0.98) 
 
-0.24 
(-0.48) 
 
0.06 
(0.10) 
Adj.R2 0.35 0.35 0.06 0.10 0.44 0.44 0.04 0.08 0.63 0.63 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.30 
Sample Size 98 98 79 79 98 98 79 79 98 98 79 79 98 98 79 79 
Note: t-values are in parenthesis.  ***, ** and * indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.   
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IV. Supervision of Financial Conglomerates in Korea 
 
 
As emphasized above, financial groups present the risk of contagion - the spread 
of financial problems among different entities within the group. As such, one entity 
suffering from financial unsoundness such as an impairment of capital or liquidity or 
an excessive build-up of risk exposures may place the soundness of the rest of the 
group at risk, which would otherwise be sound. Considering this, the supervision of 
financial conglomerates needs to take a group-wide perspective as well as a solo 
perspective. Hence, although solo supervision of individual entities continues to be 
of primary importance, the complementary role of consolidated financial supervision, 
which assesses the impact on the safety and soundness of operations of all the 
entities within a group, needs to be emphasized. Indeed, the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision addressed this issue in the 1997 report on Core Principles for 
Effective Banking Supervision, which stated that, “An essential element of banking 
supervision is the ability of supervisors to supervise the banking group on a consolidated 
basis.”  
In Korea, among the three types of financial groups - financial holding company, 
parent-subsidiary model, and mixed conglomerate, a primitive form of consolidated 
supervision has been applied only to financial holding companies. Although entities 
of parent-subsidiary model and the mixed conglomerate are subject to supervision 
on a solo basis, there are no group-wide regulations on capital adequacy and 
restrictions on intra-group transactions such as limits on credit exposure. Moreover, 
regulators in Korea do not have access to relevant data on non-financial subsidiaries, 
which may be necessary for adequate supervision of the entire group. 
As part of the Korean government’s initiative to meet international regulatory 
standards, the Financial Holding Company Act was introduced in October 2000, 
which is largely based upon the U.S. Bank Holding Company Act. While sharing 
most of key features, two acts show some minor differences.23 Key features of the 
Korean financial holding company act can be summarized as follows.   
First, approval of the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) is required for 
establishing a financial holding company based on the following criteria: 1) sound 
business plan, 2) qualification for major shareholders, 3) sound financial and 
management performance, 4) adequate equity swap ratio.  
Second, the financial holding company must own 50% or more of the affiliates’ 
voting securities, whereas for a listed company, controlling ownership requirement 
is 30%. In case an affiliate of a financial holding company seeks ownership control of 
another affiliate, the same requirements are applied. Financial holding companies are 
prohibited from owning a non-financial firm. 
Third, a financial holding company can engage in all financial activities including 
banking, insurance and securities.  
Fourth, the Financial Supervisory Commission has adopted a risk-based 
  
                                                 
23 In the U.S., the financial holding company – a bank holding company that, having met certain 
capital, managerial, and community reinvestment criteria, can engage in any financial activity pursuant 
to the Gramm-Leach-Blliley Act of 1999. 
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<Table 10> Key features of Financial Holding Companies in Korea and the U.S. 
 Korea United States 
Prior 
approval and 
standards of 
authorization 
 
  Approved by FSC 
  Criteria: 1) sound business plans, 
2) requirements for being major 
shareholders, 3) sound financial 
and management performance, 4) 
adequate equity swap ratio   
  Approved by FRB 
  Financial holding company is a 
bank holding company that, 
having met certain 1) capital, 2) 
managerial, and 3) community 
reinvestment criteria 
Criteria for 
Controlling 
Ownership in 
Subsidiaries  
  FHC must own 50% or more of 
the affiliates’ voting shares (30% 
or more for a list company)  
  In case an affiliate of a FHC 
seeking ownership control of 
another affiliate, the requirements 
are same 
  Financial holding companies are 
prohibited from owning a non-
financial firm.  
 
  More broad interpretation of 
criteria for being subsidiaries  
1) Any company 25% or more of 
the affiliates’ voting securities, 2) 
any company the election of a 
majority of directors is 
controlled in any manner by 
holding company, 3) any 
company with respect to the 
management of which holding 
company has the power, directly 
or indirectly, to exercise a 
controlling influence, as 
determined by the FRB.    
Permissible 
Activities 
  All financial activities including  
banking, insurance, and 
securities, etc.  
 
 
 
 
  Activities, FRB has determined to 
be 1) “financial in nature,” 2) 
“incidental to such financial 
activity,” or 3) “complementary 
to a financial activity” and posing 
no “substantial risk to the safety 
and soundness of depository 
institutions or the financial 
system generally” 
Capital 
Adequacy 
  The sum of the individual net 
equity capital for individual 
group members should exceed 
the sum of the solo capital 
requirements for individual 
group members. 
  BIS capital adequacy ratio for the 
entire group is formulated on a 
consolidated basis 
Prompt 
Corrective 
Action (PCA) 
  The FHCs are ordered to engage 
in PCAs when the FSC deems it 
necessary on the basis of the ratio 
of equity capital to the requisite 
capital below stipulated level and 
the composite grade of LOPECM. 
  The PCA applies only to FDIC-
insured depository institutions 
and not to bank holding 
companies. 
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<Table 10> Continued 
 Korea United States 
Restrictions 
on intra-
group 
transactions 
  Affiliates are prohibited from 
investment between affiliates in 
the same group and extending 
credit to the FHC.  
  An affiliate’s total credit extension 
with any one affiliate cannot 
exceed 10% of the affiliate’s 
capital. The affiliate’s total credit 
extensions with all affiliates 
combined cannot exceed 20% of 
the affiliate’s capital. 
  Extension of credit among 
affiliates must be fully secured 
with qualifying collateral, which 
must be worth 100 to 130% of the 
amount of the extension of credit, 
with the percentage depending on 
the type of collateral (100% for 
Korea government securities; 
110% for municipal securities, 
130% for others) 
  A FHC or any affiliates cannot 
purchase a low-quality asset from 
an affiliate. 
  A Bank’s total covered 
transactions1) with any one 
affiliate cannot exceed 10% of the 
bank’s capital. The bank’s total 
covered transactions with all 
affiliates combined cannot exceed 
20% of the bank’s capital. 
  Most covered transactions must 
be fully secured with qualifying 
capital.  The collateral must be 
worth 100 to 130% of the covered 
transaction, with the percentage 
depending on the type of 
collateral: 100% for US 
government securities; 110% for 
state and municipal securities; 
120% for other qualifying debt, 
and 130% for stock, leases, or 
other real or personal property. 
  A bank cannot purchase a low-
quality asset from an affiliate  
Information 
sharing 
  Affiliates within the same group 
are allowed to share personal 
information on customers 
without consent.   
 
 
  Affiliates within the same group 
are allowed to share personal 
information on customers 
without consent. 
  Consumers have the right to opt 
out of having their information 
shared with certain third parties 
Note: 1) A bank engages in a covered transaction when it 1) extends credit to, or for the benefit of, an affiliate; 
2) issues a guarantee for the benefit of an affiliate; 3) purchases assets from an affiliate; 4) accepts 
securities issued by an affiliate as collateral for an extension of credit, including an extension of credit to 
a third party; 5) invests in securities issued by an affiliate. 
 
 
deduction approach proposed by the Joint Forum for Financial Conglomerate24 to 
                                                 
24 Joint Forum, which was established in 1996 under the auspices of the BCBS, IOSCO, and IAIS, has 
proposed techniques that facilitate the assessment of capital adequacy on a group-wide basis for financial 
conglomerates and identification of double or multiple gearing, in which the same capital is used 
simultaneously as a buffer against risk in two or more legal entities (Joint Forum, Capital Adequacy 
Principles Paper, 1999). The Joint Forum prescribes three methods for the measurement of the group 
capital of financial conglomerates: building-block prudential approach, risk-based aggregation approach 
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assess the capital adequacy of financial holding companies. Accordingly, the sum of 
the individual net equity capitals for individual group members must exceed the 
sum of the solo capital requirements for individual group members.   
Fifth, the financial holding companies are ordered to engage in prompt corrective 
actions (PCAs) when the Financial Supervisory Commission deems it necessary on 
the basis of the ratio of net equity capital to the regulatory required capital below 
stipulated levels and the composite grade of LOPECM (Lead subsidiary, Other 
subsidiary, Parent company, consolidated Earnings, Capital adequacy, and 
Management). PCA consists of three sets of progressively more stringent corrective 
procedures (see Table 11).  
Sixth, the Financial Holding Company Act imposes quantitative and qualitative 
limits on certain kinds of intra-group transactions. An affiliate of a financial holding 
company cannot make an investment in other affiliate within the same group. 
Furthermore, an extension of credit to holding company by affiliates is prohibited. 
The Financial Holding Company Act imposes limits on credit extension among 
affiliates. An affiliate’s total credit extensions to any one affiliate cannot exceed 10% 
of the affiliate’s capital. The affiliate’s total credit extensions to all affiliates combined 
cannot exceed 20% of the affiliate’s capital. Extensions of credits among affiliates 
must be fully secured with qualifying collateral. The collateral must be worth 100 to 
130% of the amount of the extended credit, with the percentage depending upon the 
type of collateral (100% for Korean government securities; 110% for municipal 
securities; and 130% for others). A financial holding company or any affiliate cannot 
purchase a low-quality asset from other affiliates. 
Seventh, in order to enhance synergy effects such as cross selling of products and 
services among affiliates in a financial holding company, affiliates within the same 
group are allowed to share information on customers without customers’ consent.  
 
 
V. Policy Implications and Suggestions 
 
 
Above diagnostic analysis indicates that one cannot ascertain a clear-cut 
relationship between financial consolidation and the risk of individual 
conglomerates or systemic risk potential. However, recent experiences and 
developments in both advanced countries and emerging market countries seem to 
indicate that a more consolidated financial system dominated with a few large 
financial conglomerates may bring about potentially significant financial instability, 
especially if the concentration and conglomeration create ‘too-big-to-fail’ problems. 
                                                                                                                            
and risk-based deduction approach. The risk-based deduction method emphasizes the amount and 
transferability of capital available to the parent or other members of the group. Essentially, this approach 
takes the balance sheet of each company within the group and looks through to the net assets of each 
related company, making use of unconsolidated regulatory data. Under this method, the book value of 
each participation in a dependant company is replaced in the participating company's balance sheet by 
the difference between the relevant share of the dependant's capital surplus or deficit. Any holdings of 
the dependant company in other group companies are also treated in a similar manner. However, any 
reciprocal interest, whether direct or indirect, of a dependant company in a participating company is 
assumed to have zero value and is, therefore, to be eliminated from the calculation.  
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 <Table 11> Prompt Corrective Actions for Financial Holding Company in Korea 
Conditions when measures are taken 
Measures 
(Decision maker) 
Ratio of 
Equity 
Capital to 
Regulatory 
Required 
capital 
Management 
Performance 
Detailed Measures 
Management 
Improvement 
Recommendations 
(Governor of 
FSS) 
Below 
100% 
  Above the third grade in 
LOPECM, but below the 
fourth grade in the 
evaluation item of 
“parent company” or 
capital adequacy 
  It seems evident that the 
above cut-off conditions 
are not satisfied because 
of the large financial 
debacle 
  Improvement in personnel 
management and 
organizational operation 
  Cost reduction 
  Restrictions in fixed asset 
investment, entry to new 
business, and new financial 
investment 
  Disposal of insolvent assets  
  Recapitalization   
  Restriction of dividend 
payout   
  Arrangements of special 
loan loss provisioning  
Management 
Improvement 
Requirements 
(FSC) 
Below 
75% 
  Below the fourth grade in 
LOPECM 
  It seems evident that the 
above cut-off conditions 
are not satisfied because 
of the large financial 
debacle 
  Retrenchment of organiza-
tion 
  Restriction of holding risky 
assets and  disposal of 
assets 
  Requirement of manage-
ment turnover 
  Partial suspension of 
business operation 
  Restructuring of subsidi-
aries  
  Planning of M&A, or 
transfer of business entirely 
or partially 
Management 
Improvement 
Orders 
(FSC) 
Below 
25% 
  Unsound financial 
Institutions specified in 
The Act Concerning 
Structural Improvement 
of Financial Industry 
  Write-off of shares  
  Prohibition of execution by 
management and nomina-
tion of manager 
  Merger  
  Full or partial transfer of 
business operation 
  Third-party takeover of the 
FHC 
  Suspension of business 
operation for less than 6 
months 
  Full or partial transfer of 
contracts 
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As we have emphasized above, the effectiveness of existing financial regulatory 
system has been significantly undermined in the face of on-going financial 
consolidation and conglomeration. With increasingly limited ability of supervisory 
and monetary authorities to control financial risks and cope with financial disruption, 
it has become an urgent task to devise a new regulatory regime capable of 
preventing excessive risk-taking of financial conglomerates and regulatory 
forbearance of financial supervisors. Given that the regulatory system could become 
effective only if it is accompanied with strong market discipline, it has also become 
critical to create an environment where market participants have a strong incentive 
to monitor risks and penalize financial institutions if they take on too much risk. 
In the era of financial consolidation and conglomeration, the regulatory system 
must be reformed toward a more market and risk-based system, and existing capital-
based static financial supervision must also be shifted toward a more dynamic 
supervision focused on the soundness and effectiveness of management and internal 
control processes. Furthermore, in safeguarding the financial system, regulations on 
the governance and disclosure requirements for financial conglomerates need to be 
further strengthened in order to effectively complement official supervision with 
internal and market monitoring. With a view to establishing the new regulatory 
regime, this section addresses policy issues and puts forward a set of policy 
recommendations for Korea. 
 
 
1. Strengthening Governance System and Risk Management 
Capacity of Financial Conglomerates 
 
The first step to cope with risk-taking incentives of large financial conglomerates 
is to establish a transparent and accountable governance system at financial 
conglomerates. In the absence of a proper governance mechanism, managers of 
financial conglomerates may maximize their own benefit at the expense of outside 
stakeholders such as shareholders and depositors. The costs to investors of 
monitoring managers are known as agency costs, and the establishment of an 
effective governance system greatly reduces this agency cost.  
Indeed, since 1997 financial crisis, Korean banks have revamped their internal 
governance systems. Non-executive outside directors, audit committee, and 
compliance officer systems were introduced in January 2000 to strengthen the 
governance and internal control procedures within banks. Furthermore, various 
reform measures have also been implemented to upgrade bank accounting and 
disclosure systems in order to facilitate bank monitoring by depositors and investors.  
While the governance system and internal control mechanisms were relatively 
well established for individual commercial banks, as for financial conglomerates, the 
group governance and internal control systems have not yet been fully established. 
Financial holding companies have not fully come to grips with the complex 
organizational control and risk structures within group. For instance, as we have 
seen from the case of credit card industry in Korea, the failure of risk management at 
non-bank financial subsidiaries is easily transmitted as a financial loss to affiliated 
bank subsidiaries regardless of the risk management effort on the part of bank 
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subsidiaries. Non-compliance of regulations and illegal activities at non-bank 
subsidiaries also cause a significant damage to the reputation of bank subsidiary as 
well as entire financial group that shares identical brand name. 
While the governance systems at respective subsidiaries must be strengthened, 
parent holding companies need to establish a strong internal mechanism to identify, 
monitor, aggregate and effectively control overall group risk as individual risks of 
subsidiaries easily propagate in a non-linear way. In particular, the governance 
system at bank subsidiaries needs to be further strengthened in order to prevent 
possible transfer of risks circumventing internal firewalls among subsidiaries within 
a financial group. Even if bank subsidiaries are wholly owned by the parent holding 
company, there must be independent outside directors at the board of bank 
subsidiaries in order to monitor bank managers on behalf of depositors and outside 
investors. This is especially so when the deposit insurance backed by tax-payers 
money is extended to bank liabilities.25 
Strengthening risk management capacity at financial conglomerates has become a 
key task in maintaining financial stability in the face of increased uncertainty and 
innovative financial flows. With the contagion and non-linear propagation of risks 
within a financial group, it is especially important for financial conglomerates to 
implement a consolidated risk management at a group level. Financial holding 
companies must be able to identify risk exposures of the entire group and implement 
a system to avoid excessive concentration of risks by allocating risk limits over 
subsidiaries. At the same time, a transparent group risk management policy 
framework must be established and consistently applied in which various risk 
measures and targets are coordinated across holding company and its subsidiaries 
within a financial group. 
With financial consolidation, the management of operational risks has become a 
particularly challenging task for large financial conglomerates. However, regardless 
of their increasingly complex scope of businesses, the management of operational 
risks at Korean financial conglomerates still remains at a rudimentary level. As 
recently suggested by the Basel Committee (2003), an effective operational risk 
management framework requires, as crucial elements, clear strategies and oversight 
by the board of directors and senior management, a strong operational risk and 
internal control culture including clear lines of responsibility and segregation of 
duties, effective internal reporting, and contingency planning. Financial 
conglomerates must establish clear policies and processes to identify, measure and 
                                                 
25 It is controversial whether independent directors are required for the board of directors at the 
100% owned bank subsidiary. The arguments against the independent director requirement are fourfold: 
First, the monitoring and controlling function of the parent holding company could be in conflict with the 
functioning of the board of directors at the subsidiary bank. Second, Foreign countries such as the U.S. 
(article 36 of the FDIC Act) and Japan (commercial code) do not require independent directors and audit 
committee composition for subsidiaries of financial holding companies. Third, the protection of the 
interests of other stake-holders such as employees and creditors is the duty of all directors rather than the 
duty of independent directors, and hence, it must be protected by other measures such as multiple 
derivative suits. Fourth, since the financial holding company assumes all legal liabilities and risks that 
result from the failure of monitoring and controlling the bank subsidiary, a full management authority 
commensurate with the liability must be allowed to the holding company. However, these views are 
ignorant of the fact that the provision of a public safety net to banks may complicate the agency problem 
not only among the stakeholders of a bank but also among the protected bank and the parent holding 
company especially when other non-bank subsidiaries are not protected by the public safety net.  
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control operational risks, and the framework must be consistently implemented at 
both group and subsidiary levels. 
 
 
2. Risk-based Consolidated Supervision of Financial 
Conglomerates  
 
Given the increased potential for systemic risk in the presence of large and 
complex financial conglomerates, more intense and sophisticated supervision is 
necessary for those potentially ‘too-big and few-to-fail’ institutions. Effective devices 
must be introduced to avoid inadvertent extension of public safety net to cross-
sectoral activities such as investment banking and other non-bank financial services. 
Large financial conglomerates are often important players in capital markets, and 
hence, failures of financial conglomerates present potentially systemic vulnerabilities 
in direct financing as well as in indirect financing. As such, ensuring financial 
conglomerates to maintain a sound asset quality and robust capital base is crucial to 
the stability of entire financial system. 
For timely and effective monitoring of risks at large financial conglomerates, the 
supervisory framework must be improved to risk-based consolidated supervision. 
With traditional static capital-based approaches, it is almost impossible to evaluate 
accurately the development and propagation of risks implied in the cross-border 
provision of financial services and market activities of complex financial 
conglomerates. Risk-based consolidated supervision is an essential element of 
effective prudential regulation in the era of financial consolidation. Consolidated 
supervision is based upon consolidated information about the entire financial 
conglomerate and enables systematic monitoring of risks implied in banking and 
non-banking activities of subsidiaries from a joint perspective. Consolidated 
accounting and prudential regulatory measures are integral parts of consolidated 
supervision. 
As described above, currently in Korea, consolidated financial supervision has 
not yet been fully introduced. Only a rudimentary framework is currently applied to 
financial holding companies and no consolidated framework has been introduced 
for other type of financial groups. For instance, a key prudential supervisory 
measure is capital adequacy regulation. The capital adequacy regulation for financial 
holding company groups in Korea is currently based upon the required capital. 
Specifically, the net sum of equity capitals of the holding company and its 
subsidiaries must be greater than the simple sum of regulatory capital requirements 
for respective group member subsidiaries.   
Following the spirit of pillar 1 of the new BIS Basel accord, capital adequacy 
standard for financial conglomerates must be more tightly linked with risk capital 
aggregated for the entire financial conglomerate. The amount of risk for a financial 
group could be substantially different from the simple sum of risks at its subsidiaries 
as we have shown in the above diagnostic analysis. The capital adequacy standard 
for financial conglomerates must be able to reflect potential contagion and 
propagation of risks within group, and the first step required in this regard is to 
adopt a framework based upon the group BIS capital ratio computed from fully 
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consolidated financial statements of financial conglomerates. 
For an effective consolidated supervision of financial conglomerates, financial 
supervisors must be equipped with relevant capabilities and organizational structure 
as emphasized by pillar 2 of the new Basel accord. Special supervisory units for on-
going off-site surveillance of financial conglomerates need to be established, and 
monitoring and early warning systems must be strengthened. In addition, the 
supervisors must be able to assess the effectiveness of internal risk management and 
capital allocation approaches of financial conglomerates. 
 
 
3. Minimizing ‘Too-big-to-fail’ and Regulatory Forbearance 
 
As discussed above, large financial conglomerates may engage in moral hazard 
and aggressive risk-taking given the possibility of regulatory forbearance and 
expectations of ‘too-big-to-fail’. An important way to ensure that financial 
supervisors do not engage in regulatory forbearance is through strict 
implementation of prompt corrective action provisions, which require supervisors to 
intervene as early as possible. Prompt corrective action is crucial to preventing 
failures of financial conglomerates because it creates incentives for financial 
conglomerates not to take on too much risk in the first place, recognizing that if they 
do so, they are more likely to be subject to regulatory actions.  
In Korea, prompt corrective action provisions were first introduced in April 
1998.26 With the enactment of the Financial Holding Company Act, a similar prompt 
corrective action provision was formally introduced for financial holding companies 
in October 2000. The prompt corrective action for financial holding company groups 
is currently based upon the group net equity capital to required capital ratio and the 
LOPECM-based evaluation results.27 According to the provision, the Governor of 
the Financial Supervisory Service must recommend, require, and order financial 
holding companies to take necessary management improvement measures if the 
ratio of net equity capital to the required capital falls below 100%, 75%, and 25% 
respectively. As noted above, the criteria may not fully reflect risks of financial 
conglomerates, and hence, the criteria for prompt corrective action for conglomerates 
must be changed into the one based upon the group BIS capital ratio.  
Moreover, note that a key element in making prompt corrective action work is the 
mandatory nature of the scheme, which makes it a credible threat for financial 
institutions. Hence, discretionary applications of the provision must be minimized. 
In the case of large financial conglomerates, systemic risk could be a concern when 
                                                 
26 Prompt corrective action provisions were first introduced in April 1998 for commercial banks and 
merchant banking corporations, and then subsequently extended to securities and insurance companies 
in June 1998 and to investment trust management companies and credit specialized financial companies 
in 2001. According to the provision, for instance, banks are classified into five groups by the BIS capital 
ratio and the CAMELS-based evaluation results of bank management CAMELS is the evaluation criteria 
for bank performance and denotes capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings, liquidity, and 
sensitivity to market risk, respectively. The supervisory authority could impose various corrective 
measures whenever banks’ BIS capital adequacy ratios and management evaluation grades fall below 
predetermined criteria. 
27 LOPECM denotes lead subsidiaries, other subsidiaries, parent, earnings consolidated, capital 
adequacy consolidated, and managerial composite. 
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strictly applying the prompt corrective action. However, this systemic risk concern 
itself brings about moral hazard for large financial conglomerates. Moreover, the 
expectation of future bailouts causes additional distortions in fund flows and 
increases market power of large financial groups, which in turn results in de-facto 
government subsidies to large conglomerates with taxpayers’ money as collateral. As 
argued by Hahm and Mishkin (2000), it is important to recognize that, although 
large financial conglomerates may be too big to liquidate, they can be closed with 
losses imposed on uninsured creditors. Except under very unusual circumstances, 
the least-cost resolution procedure must be strictly applied by imposing loss to 
uninsured depositors and creditors.28 
In a related context, there must be strict limitations on within financial group 
transactions to prevent financial conglomerates from transferring deposit insurance 
subsidy extended to bank subsidiaries to other affiliated non-bank subsidiaries. As 
argued by Mishkin (1999), financial consolidation opens up opportunities to reduce 
the scope of deposit insurance and limit it to narrow bank accounts, substantially 
reducing the moral hazard. The deposit insurance fund backed by tax payers’ money 
must be used only to protect insured depositors of bank subsidiaries and must be 
effectively insulated from bailing out other subsidiaries. 
 
 
4. Strengthening Disclosure Requirements and Market Discipline 
 
Note that the increasing complexity of the asset portfolio and business structures 
of large financial conglomerates substantially attenuates both financial authority’s 
supervisory capacity and monitoring ability of outside stakeholders. An answer to 
these problems is to have the financial market discipline financial conglomerates by 
providing more transparent information on the management of large financial group 
and by establishing a more market-based supervisory framework. In other words, it 
is necessary to establish a strong market discipline as a complement to official 
supervision. 
Disclosure requirements are essential for market participants to have relevant 
information, which allows them to monitor financial institutions and keep them from 
taking on too much risk. A recent study by the U.S. Federal Reserve Board indicates 
that disclosure requirements for large complex banking organizations need to be 
strengthened in the areas such as securitizations and loan sales, internal asset risk 
rating and loan loss reserve calculations, credit concentrations by counterparty, 
industry, or geography, market risks, and risks by legal entity and business lines 
(Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2000). In a similar vein, public 
disclosure requirements need to be further strengthened for large financial 
conglomerates in Korea. 
                                                 
28 In December 2000, the Korean government enacted the Special Act on Public Fund Management, 
according to which, the Public Fund Oversight Committee was established under the Ministry of Finance 
and Economy. While the principle of the least-cost resolution was formally introduced in the act, it is still 
possible that the principle can be applied in a discretionary way by the judgment of the committee over 
systemic risk concerns. To prevent regulatory forbearance for large financial conglomerates, the 
conditionality for systemic risk exception must be explicitly set out and strengthened further. 
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With the effort to promote information transparency, supervisory authorities need 
to introduce more market-based regulatory measures, such as requiring financial 
conglomerates to issue subordinated debt. Subordinated debt with a ceiling on the 
spread between its interest rate and the interest rate on government bonds could 
become an effective disciplinary tool. If a financial group is taking on too much risk, 
it is unlikely to be able to issue subordinated debt within the designated spread cap. 
Hence, compliance with the subordinated debt requirement would be a direct way 
for the market to force financial conglomerates to limit their risk taking. 
Alternatively, differential deposit insurance premium could be charged according to 
the interest rate on the subordinated debt. Information about whether financial 
conglomerates can issue subordinated debts and the interest rate on the 
subordinated debt itself can help the public evaluate supervisors’ action, which in 
turn reduces the scope of regulatory forbearance. 
 
 
5. Early Recognition and Effective Management of Systemic Risk: 
Coordination among the MOFE, FSC and BOK 
 
As emphasized above, in the era of financial consolidation and conglomeration, 
early detection and prevention of systemic crisis is crucially important. To establish 
an effective preventive mechanism, it is critical to have an institutional channel for 
communication, cooperation, and check and balance among related regulatory 
authorities – especially among the financial supervisory authority, central bank, and 
the ministry of finance and economy.29  
While it is financial supervisor’s responsibility to maintain the soundness of 
financial institutions, it is rather a controversial issue who must bear the 
responsibility for the development and realization of systemic risk. It is especially 
true when imprudent macroeconomic policies cause unusual fund flows in the 
financial system and bring about deterioration of asset qualities for financial 
institutions. For instance, monetary policy of the central bank and foreign exchange 
policy of the finance ministry are more or less directly linked with credit boom-bust 
cycles in emerging market countries. In addition, the prudential regulation policy of 
the supervisory authority is often influenced by the stabilization policy of the finance 
ministry, which seems to be more politically concerned. Another area that calls for a 
tight coordination among the related regulators is the payment and settlement 
system. Disruptions in the payment and settlement system could be a potentially 
significant source of systemic risk. The central bank, which is the overseer of the 
payment and settlement system, must be closely coordinate with the supervisory 
authority as the failure of large conglomerates may cause a significant disruption for 
the system.  
In Korea, the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE) is ultimately responsible 
for the stability of the entire financial system. However, there must be operational 
                                                 
29 Kim (2004) provided a comprehensive and detailed case study of the recent failure of credit card 
industries in Korea and emphasized the importance of a cooperative and mutually accountable system 
among public regulatory bodies such as the Ministry of Finance and Economy, Bank of Korea, Financial 
Supervisory Service and the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation.   
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institutional mechanisms in which financial policies of the MOFE can be coordinated 
with the prudential regulation and supervisory policies of the Financial Supervisory 
Commission (FSC) and the monetary policies of the Bank of Korea (BOK). The 
institutional scheme must be able to systematically identify and monitor potential 
sources and propagation channels of systemic risk developments, and provide early 
warning signals for policy makers and financial institutions.  
In order for this mechanism to work effectively, an official committee on macro 
financial supervision needs to be established, where the minister of MOFE, chairman 
of the FSC, and the governor of the BOK meet on a regular basis and share timely 
information among the regulatory authorities. For instance, the supervisory 
authority’ institutional micro supervision information must be shared with the 
central bank’s macroeconomic financial market information.  
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